| Khodorkovsky Victim of International Politics? |
| Tuesday, 12 May 2009 | |
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On the one hand, there is clearly a Kafkaesque element to Khodorkovsky’s latest trial (Amsterdam has referred to the Khodorkovsky trial as “Kafka on steroids”): just as his eight-year sentence was coming to an end, Khodorkovsky has been charged anew with fraud and embezzlement – and for considerable sums (over $30 billion). It would be difficult for the Kremlin to hide the fact that there is an element of personal vendetta in the air. On the other hand, the West is not entirely blameless for Khodorkovsky’s fate, including the recent turn of events. Indeed, as politically motivated as the Kremlin’s Khodorkovsky and Yukos stance may be, Western voices – in the media, specialized press, blogosphere, all overwhelmingly critical of Russia – are hardly politically detached themselves. Neither viewpoint is truly neutral, but clearly Western commentary of the Khodorkovsky trial does not contribute to the unbiased and independent atmosphere required for a fair trial. Furthermore, foreign meddling has never been popular in Russia and, in reality, this meddling is likely only to exacerbate tensions, not ease them. The result will almost certainly be more radicalization and polarization, not less, with all parties simply talking past each other. For Khodorkovsky, who stands most to lose from this spat between Russia and Western pundits, the stake are obviously the highest. The risk is that, from talking past each other, the end result is a screaming match in which Khodorkovsky is caught in the middle. A perfect example of this hardened dialogue comes from one of Khodorkovsky’s legal counsels, Robert Amsterdam. Amsterdam is known first and foremost for his vast communication strategy rather than his courtroom skills. Amsterdam’s tactic of choice has been a public relations and lobbying campaign just as bent on brandishing his client as victim of anti-liberal forces than on smearing Russia. “We see this trial as a vivid example of selective application of the law,” Amsterdam has said. What Amsterdam is tacitly admitting, however, is the fact that Khodorkovsky was indeed on the wrong side of the law – just that he was not alone. Khodorkovsky, though, was not just any oligarch: not only was he the richest, but he was arguably the most powerful of the oligarchs – his giant Cyprus-based Menatep bank being responsible for a disproportionate number of post-Soviet privatizations. When Putin reigned in the oligarchs’ power after he became President in 2000, Khodorkovsky fought back ruthlessly. Dangling the prospect of his Yukos oil group being partly sold to one of the West’s ‘Seven Sisters’, ExxonMobil, he gladly took on the role of defender of free markets in Russia. The West happily bought into this scenario, quickly forgetting that Khodorkovsky’s concept of a “free market economy” long involved violence and threats, physical coercion and, quite possibly, assassinations – for that was the norm in Russia in the 1990s. Ignoring this, and showcasing Khodorkovsky as a model of free markets frustrated by an authoritarian central government, as Amsterdam and others have done, only aggravates the problem: since this fact is rather debatable, presenting such assurance belies a hidden agenda – or excessive cynicism. All things considered, Khodorkovsky – though it is uncertain he is to be pitied – may be more a victim of international rather than domestic politics. Caught between the Russian leadership and public opinion bent on erasing the West-inflicted humiliation of the 1990s on the one hand, and Western observers incensed about Russia’s more vocal independence and toughness on the other, Khodorkovsky, for all the crimes he may have committed, may be paying more than he deserves. |
The trial of Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, though it could have remained a mostly internal, Russian, affair, has spilled over to the arena of international politics.| Next > |
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